New York, New York
MR. BREMMER: So, I mean, for a lot of us here, this is the coolest thing going on in New York City right now. There’s a lot of self-selection in this crowd. (Applause.) So, a very warm welcome to my friend, Jake Sullivan.
And also, just to say, we’re going to run this for, like, you know, 45 minutes, an hour, and then we’ll get some questions from the audience, which will be fun. They’ll come in on cards, so please fill them out, make them interesting and hard and engaging, because we both like that.
And also, this is being livestreamed, and I don’t know if they have any capacity to send us questions, and I suspect we’ll ignore those. But nonetheless, we’re delighted that there are people that are joining us.
So with all of that, Jake, welcome.
MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you for having me. It’s really good to be here.
MR. BREMMER: Thank you for being here. You just got back from the Middle East.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.
MR. BREMMER: We’re going to talk about the whole world, but maybe start there.
You know, in the last year, you and I have spoken a lot more about the Middle East than we had before. I’m wondering, in terms of biggest surprises, is it how much the Israelis have established, reestablished escalation dominance? Is it Iran and the Axis of Resistance looking like a big deal and then imploding? Is it what just happened with Assad and the rollout in Syria? Where would you stack the “this is the thing that we probably least expected”?
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. (Laughter.)
I mean, not to be — every one of those pieces has been maybe not surprising directionally, in the sense that, you know, one could see the ways in which Israel — frankly, backed by the United States in terms of much of what it has accomplished — was taking the fight to its enemies. One could see the weakening and the fracturing of the Axis of Resistance and the weakening of Iran. And one could see the pressure on Assad, particularly because his two main patrons, Iran and Russia, were distracted and weakened.
But the speed, the scope, and the scale of the remaking of the Middle East in this short amount of time, I think you’d find very few people who could have predicted all of that and that we would be sitting here in December of 2024 with the picture looking the way that it looks.
MR. BREMMER: Does the picture today look at least modestly more stable than it did a year ago, or does it look worse?
MR. SULLIVAN: You know, I’ve been reflecting on this question, because the thing about foreign policy and geopolitics is that when good things happen, often bad things follow. When bad things happen, often good things follow. And nothing is ever fixed in time. There’s always something around the corner.
So is there a huge opportunity right now? Absolutely. In that sense, the possibility of a more stable, integrated Middle East, where our friends are stronger, our enemies are weaker — that is real. And in fact, Iran is at its weakest point in —
MR. BREMMER: Decades.
MR. SULLIVAN: — in modern memory.
On the other hand, there are huge risk factors, and you can see them maybe most in living color in Syria, where the Syrian people have the chance to build a better future in a post-Assad world, but where there are very evil people who are looking to take advantage of this current moment, starting with ISIS, but other terrorist and jihadist groups as well. And it will take collective resolve, wisdom, and willingness to act in order to ensure that we don’t see in Syria what we had previously seen in Libya, but on a larger scale where the geography is actually even more dangerous for not just our interests, but the interests of our friends and allies.
So I think we’re at a moment of profound opportunity but also a moment of profound risk, and that means that we have to handle this situation with clarity and effectiveness. And the interesting thing is this comes in the middle of a presidential transition in the United States.
MR. BREMMER: Which makes it harder for you.
MR. SULLIVAN: It makes it harder because —
MR. BREMMER: I’m thinking specifically Syria, for example. Right?
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, I mean, it makes it harder because — you know, and this is something that my successor, Mike Waltz, has actually said — other countries, other actors, particularly our enemies and adversaries, look at transitions as moments of opportunity, because you have this seam between an outgoing administration and incoming administration.
And so, the imperative on us, both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration, has to be to lash up more tightly than is typical, to spend more time together than is typical, and to try to ensure we are sending a common, clear message to both friends and adversaries in the Middle East, and we have endeavored to do that over the last few weeks.
Obviously, we disagree on a lot of things under the sun, including perhaps on certain aspects of long-term strategy in the Middle East or elsewhere, but where we agree is on many of the fundamentals here and especially on the point that we should not let anyone take advantage of the United States during this time of transition. And so that has meant that Congressman Waltz and me and other people on each of our teams have tried to work so closely together.
MR. BREMMER: Because I’m going to dig in more on Iran and the Middle East than other pieces. But before I do, I want to beat on this, which is that, you know, I think some people were surprised that when Trump won, that Biden and President-elect Trump had a very civil sit-down discussion in the White House, despite what they had both said about each other over the previous months. And more recently, you’ve had several very constructive meetings with the incoming National Security Advisor. And frankly, my sense is that the alignment in how both of you see the world is a lot more similar on a bunch of policies than most people in the public would presume. Is that a fair thing to say?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think it’s fair at an elemental level of each of us being totally committed to the American national interest, each of us recognizing that we have real adversaries in the world, one of them being Iran, and we have friends and allies who we need to stand up and defend and back, one of them being Israel. And so, that gives you a basis to work on.
Now, you know, I have been myself, President Biden has, the rest of our national security team has been subject to lots of criticism from President Trump’s team over the course of the past years. We’ve criticized President Trump’s statements and record on foreign policy. So it’s not like we see everything the same way.
But at this moment, on big-ticket items, when we need some degree of smoothness and continuity in the handoff from one administration to the next, I think both the outgoing and incoming administrations see the bigger picture. And that’s really important.
We will get back to the debates on hard issues and real disagreements, and there will be things that the next administration does that I won’t like. I will tell you, I’ll be a lot less vocal about that probably. Having sat in this seat for four years and listened to people criticize what we do, one thing I’ve realized is unless you’re sitting in this seat —
MR. BREMMER: It’s hard.
MR. SULLIVAN: — it’s hard.
But for this moment, what we are trying to do on behalf of the national interest of the United States I think is extremely important, despite, you know, the deep differences that do exist in terms of the outgoing and incoming president and outgoing and incoming administration.
MR. BREMMER: Now, I mean, the Iran story — which, of course, is America’s biggest adversary in the Middle East — I would argue we’ve managed — you’ve managed quite well over the last year. I mean, there were many moments, at least a couple of moments, where people were very concerned that this could lead into a direct kinetic war between Iran and Israel that the Americans would have to get involved in. And a lot of proactive diplomacy thus far has prevented that from happening. Now, in part, that’s because Iran is in such an abysmal strategic position, and they’ve lost so much.
If you’re Iran right now, how much are you trying to just do anything possible to stabilize relations with other countries around the world? How much are you thinking, “Oh, my God, if I don’t, like, get nukes at some point, I’m in serious trouble”? Is it all of the above? I mean, what do you think their strategic calculus is?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I think their strategic calculus has a couple of levels. One level is: Can we turn to other significant countries in the world to provide us capabilities that right now have been badly weakened and degraded. Take their air defenses, for example. So, they look to the Russians, but the Russians have their hands full —
MR. BREMMER: They’re busy.
MR. SULLIVAN: — with Ukraine. Can’t help. Perhaps they look to Beijing. But two years ago, you and I would have sat and talked about how China is on the come in the Middle East, they’re going to become a major player, they’re going to be a mover and shaker. Where have they been in the last year? Completely absent.
MR. BREMMER: Almost radio silence.
MR. SULLIVAN: So Iran, in this kind of alignment of autocracies — Iran, Russia, China, North Korea — which is a real factor that we have to look at — in practice, it’s not exactly a solution here to Iran’s problems.
So, then there’s this question: What about Iran’s nuclear program? And here, you can look at the public statements of Iranian officials, which have changed in the last few months as they have been dealt these strategic blows, to raise the question: Do we have to change our doctrine at some point?
MR. BREMMER: Members of Iranian parliament (inaudible).
MR. SULLIVAN: And the fact that that’s coming out publicly is something that has to be looked at extremely carefully. We have to consult closely with Israel on that, with our Gulf partners, with our European allies, and with others as we go forward.
And I will tell you that, you know, when I was answering your earlier question about how, you know, positive things happen and then bad things follow, an adversary that has suffered blows that weaken it is — you know, obviously presents — we could say that’s a good-news story. But it also generates choices for that adversary that can be quite dangerous, and that’s something we have to remain extremely vigilant about as we go forward.
And here again, this point of making sure that vigilance crosses that threshold of January 20th into the next administration is very important. So we’ve been bringing the incoming administration into the intelligence picture, the consultations with allies and partners on this so that we’re all basically reading off the same song sheet. They may choose a different course, a different strategy, but I want to make sure we are starting from a common base of what we are facing with respect to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program.
MR. BREMMER: Now, on the war with Israel, at this point, you feel pretty confident that the Hezbollah ceasefire is going to stick, is going to become permanent? Does that feel like it’s on the right trajectory?
MR. SULLIVAN: I have learned the hard way not to use the word “confident” and “Middle East” in the same sentence. (Laughter.) So, I won’t quite go that far. But I will say that there are incentives for this deal to stick. There is also the fact that Israel has demonstrated that it is prepared to ensure that it is not going to tolerate violations. The United States and France, as two outside players actively working to ensure the deal is enforced, we are making it known that we’re not going to let this be 2006 all over again. I think the Lebanese people do not want to turn the clock back now. They would like to see a better future for Lebanon.
So I think that the pieces are in place for this not to be temporary, for it to be durable. But it is also subject to risk itself — risk of overreach by Hezbollah trying to rebuild its terrorist infrastructure, risk of potential spillovers from Syria that could complicate the picture.
But in the main, I think we have got something in place that was a feat of Israeli military capacity and a feat of American diplomacy that can endure.
MR. BREMMER: Now, Israel has been very engaged with the United States, and constructively, on Lebanon, Hezbollah; very engaged with the United States, and constructively, on Iran; very engaged with the United States, I would argue somewhat less constructively, on Gaza over the course of the last year. Has been harder to get the Israeli government to align with a lot of what President Biden publicly has been saying.
Talk a little bit, to the extent that you can, about challenges when a close ally, the most important ally of the United States in the region, is also creating that kind of tension for day-to-day management of foreign policy.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first, just taking a step back, the challenge posed by an entrenched terrorist enemy with hundreds of miles of tunnels beneath a densely populated area, determined to keep fighting month after month, is a real challenge.
So we believe Israel has a responsibility — as a democracy, as a country committed to the basic principle of the value of innocent life, and as a member of the international community that has obligations under international humanitarian law — that it do the utmost to protect and minimize harm to civilians and that it do the utmost to facilitate humanitarian assistance so that people don’t starve or lack for water or medicine or sanitation.
And we believe too many civilians have died in Gaza over the course of this conflict. And at too many moments, you know, we’ve felt we’ve had to step up privately and publicly and push on the humanitarian front to get more trucks, more aid, more lifesaving assistance in to the people of Gaza.
MR. BREMMER: And you were doing a lot more privately on this front than people have seen publicly.
MR. SULLIVAN: Look, I think there is not a conflict in the world, in modern history, where as many people in the U.S. government, up to and including the National Security Advisor, could count for you the daily number of trucks, the crossings, the road blocks, the obstacles, as in this case. It is under the most intense microscope, understandably, because people are suffering and great harm has come to a lot of innocent people who are caught in a circumstance where Hamas is using schools and mosques and civilian infrastructure to hide and use to attack Israel and Israeli forces, but also where Israel has been constantly and persistently attacking across the entirety of the Gaza Strip.
So it’s understandable that the microscope is there, but it means that, every single day, I personally am getting a report on the humanitarian situation, I’m getting a list of the things that we need to ask of Israel to try to alleviate it. And working that day in, day out, and never being satisfied — because at the end of the day, in a war zone like this, you always want to be pushing for more, and then publicly, we have to also speak to our values and say, yes, we want to see more humanitarian aid get into Gaza — there’s nothing inconsistent with that, in my view.
And standing up strongly and resolutely for the security of the State of Israel and for Israel’s right, indeed its duty, to get after the terrorists who attacked it and caused the greatest massacre of the Jewish people since the Holocaust, and who say they want to do that again and again if given the opportunity, we should be absolutely resolute in our moral authority on that point while also being resolute in our moral authority that we can do that and also ensure that innocent people in Gaza have access to basic sustenance and lifesaving necessities.
MR. BREMMER: Well, not only are those two things not in conflict, but I think you would argue that ensuring that humanitarian aid to a much greater degree is actually incumbent on ensuring Israeli security long term.
MR. SULLIVAN: I agree with that. I think — you know, one of the things that Israeli leaders are grappling with right now is how do you take tactical gains against Hamas, and they have been significant: smashed Hamas military formations; the elimination of the top leadership, including Yahya Sinwar; the decimation of their rocket capability. Those tactical gains are real.
How do you convert that into a long-term strategic endgame where Israel is secure on a durable basis and where Gaza emerges where Hamas is not in power? And the best way to do that, in my judgment, is to have a political solution, a political track alongside the military track. And that starts with the basic concept of essentially trying to make sure that the ordinary civilians of Gaza, the innocent people of Gaza are not being put in a position where things are so bad that they all become radicalized and you have nothing to work with going forward.
MR. BREMMER: Which is kind of the direction of travel, right?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think that there still remains an opportunity to build a better future, to drive towards what President Biden has called for since long before he was President: a Palestinian state living alongside a secure, democratic, and Jewish state, meeting all of the necessary conditions so that Israelis can be confident that they are secure. And I think that is still a possibility, that we have not given up on that as a long-term goal, and we need to be taking steps towards that, and that begins with simple steps like dealing with this humanitarian situation.
MR. BREMMER: But I will not ask you if you are confident that that can happen, as you know. You’ve been through that already on the Middle East.
So one more bit on the Middle East before we move on — there’s a lot to cover — and that is Syria.
Now, here’s one where, I mean, I can see the incoming Trump administration causing you a bit of heartburn by, you know, publicly saying, “Hey, stay out of this, no matter what, militarily. It’s up to Turkey to decide kind of what to do. They’re critical.” And meanwhile, we’ve got significant questions on the ground as to how to ensure that this new regime that’s taken over can ensure a level of stability and inclusion for everyone on the ground and not allow the Turks, not allow others to take advantage. How can we manage this?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first of all, we have to recognize that the minute Damascus fell, ISIS began to look for any opportunity it could take to reconstitute, grow, spread, and ultimately recreate a platform from which to threaten the United States and Americans around the world.
And so, within hours of Assad falling and HTS rolling into Damascus, the President ordered the U.S. military to take military action against ISIS personnel and ISIS facilities in the central Syrian Desert, the Badiya, and we’re going to have to continue to do that.
So, point one is we need the capacity to go after ISIS in the east, and that’s something that, you know, we have advised the incoming administration.
The second major issue is how to ensure that we are standing up for and standing with our best and closest partners in that ISIS fight. That’s the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish-led forces, but also with a lot of Arabs fighting alongside them. We need to stand up for them and ensure that they are secure enough in their position that they can continue to be the good partners they’ve been, including with respect to the administration of these very large prisons and prison camps where you have thousands of ISIS fighters and tens of thousands of family members, wives and children of ISIS fighters, who, if they were all to get out, would represent a really quite considerable threat to the region and ultimately to the United States.
So we need to stand with the Kurds, and President Biden intends to do that. We need to stand up against ISIS. And we need to maintain our capacity in the region to be able to do these things effectively so that we don’t end up with a repeat of what happened in 2014, 2015, where ISIS came sweeping across eastern Syria and western Iraq, and we ultimately had to deploy a considerable amount of American force to beat them back.
And that was a campaign that began under Obama that ultimately came to fruition under Trump — President Trump’s first term. So, he has the experience of actually fighting ISIS in eastern Syria, in Raqqa, to ultimately rid the world of that caliphate that posed such a grave threat to Europe, the United States, and beyond.
MR. BREMMER: But there is a real and extant risk right now that Syria could become not quite Afghanistan, but, I mean, a — not just a civil war, but could actually become a primary hotbed of radical Islamic terrorism.
MR. SULLIVAN: There is a real and extant risk of that, and I don’t think we should sugarcoat that fact. But let’s keep in mind that it’s my job as National Security Advisor to frequently see the risk in a given situation. I would be remiss if I didn’t say there isn’t also a real opportunity.
Assad was a butcher, a brutally murderous dictator of his own people. Assad, you could say — you know, you could kind of take the measure of that man by his friends — Iran, Russia, Hezbollah. Him being gone is not a bad thing; we should shed no tears about that. And it presents this opportunity for the Syrian people to actually build a better future, an inclusive future that is consistent with what I think not just all of the various communities of Syria want, but which these guys who’ve rolled into Damascus are actually saying.
Now, converting words to deeds is another matter. It’s something we will be watching closely. But Syria, to me, to understand it, you have to see both the real risk — and it’s as you described — and see the opportunity and try to push things in the direction of opportunity while minimizing the risk.
MR. BREMMER: No, look, I’m asking not because I think HTS is automatically a problem to be dealt with. I agree the opportunity. I’m asking mostly because if the United States, in a short period of time, says, “Not my problem. Vacuum. Have at it,” what the potential implications of that are.
MR. SULLIVAN: And I think you put that very well. The potential implications of us precipitously creating a vacuum are highly determined, highly experienced jihadists, starting with ISIS, will look to exploit that; take territory, particularly in eastern Syria; and as we have seen before, use that territory to plan, to inspire, to direct, and to enable attacks, including in the American homeland.
MR. BREMMER: And in some ways, some of the biggest geopolitical challenges that have emerged over the course of the last decade has been a proliferation of vacuums, a proliferation of space where bad actors can act asymmetrically, some of them virtual, some of them physical and territorial, some of them sectoral. But the implications of that being for stable democracies to pick it up or wither.
MR. SULLIVAN: That’s right. And also for us — I said earlier — I used this phrase about moving fast and moving decisively. Part of that is about being prepared to engage early with the new players on the scene in Damascus, with HTS.
And Secretary Blinken, you know, let it be known a couple of days ago that we’ve actually begun to have direct engagement with HTS. And we are — Secretary Blinken sat with all the Arab states, with Turkey, with France, a couple of days ago in Aqaba, Jordan, to try to get everybody on the same page. Because the other lesson of the potential for vacuums to come in is that if you’ve got one group of strong countries on one side backing one group of folks, and you have another group of strong countries on another side backing a different group of folks, you’re more likely to have those vacuums emerge because the major responsible countries of a given region are not all pulling in the same direction. We saw that in Libya in spades. We can’t see that in Syria, which means trying to get everyone aligned around a common picture for how we go forward. That is no easy task.
But if we end up with a proxy war in Syria, I think it is only going to exacerbate the risks you’ve just described, with the possible expansion of this vacuum. And America being a part of that, being present, being engaged, not just with our physical presence but with our diplomatic initiative, is going to be vital over the coming months.
MR. BREMMER: Okay, so let’s move on. I spent — we spent a lot of time on the Middle East. Not a surprise.
I want to move to China. When you first became National Security Advisor, conventional wisdom on China is: huge powerhouse, going to become the largest economy in the world in relatively short order. That is not what we are looking at today. Their economy is in the worst shape since the ‘90s, maybe the ‘70s. You and I have talked about a meaningful possibility that they’d never become the largest economy in the world.
So, clearly, it feels like they’re on the back foot. They’re not taking the kinds of decisions that would be required to get them out of this structural economic decline for now.
How different is it dealing with a China that feels like it’s playing defense than it is in Anchorage, in the first meeting, when we’ve got a much more robust, confident China saying we got the world in our hands?
MR. SULLIVAN: You know, it’s interes- — it’s a good question, but I’m not sure that if you pushed the top echelon of leadership in China on the question, one, “is America in secular decline,” and two, “is China inexorably going to become the leading power in the world, economically, technologically, diplomatically and so forth,” they wouldn’t say yes and yes.
Still to this day, I think they’re totally wrong, and a bet against America is a very bad bet. And the engines of American power are humming right now. And I think the trajectory of China, this inexorable juggernaut, the objective evidence does not point in that direction.
But I don’t think it has actually fundamentally yet shifted entirely their mindset of statecraft about the world. What it has done —
MR. BREMMER: The timeframes have certainly shifted.
MR. SULLIVAN: The timeframes have shifted, but the basic logic of “the East is rising, the West is declining” I think remains present to this day.
MR. BREMMER: So it’s a tactical move.
MR. SULLIVAN: And so — exactly.
So I think what we’re seeing instead is just we have storms, we have to weather them, we need to manage this, but fundamentally, the long-term strategic outlook I do not perceive has altered in a significant way. And I believe that, basically, that means that U.S. policy should not move dramatically because of these developments with respect to the Chinese economy.
And it has to be built on two basic premises. One is what I just said, which is China does seek to become the world’s leading power. I do not believe that is in the interest of the United States. And the second is: No matter what the trajectory, the United States and China are going to have to learn to live alongside one another as major powers in the world for the foreseeable future. And we need terms upon which we can do that, even as we compete vigorously in all of these different domains.
That has been the basic thrust of the diplomacy that we have engaged in. It has been to create a effective management of a highly competitive relationship without for an instant taking away from the actions that we need to take to protect our technology, to enhance our deterrence, to deepen the strength of our economy, and to support our friends.
And so, we’ve tried to do both of those at once. And I think we are handing off a relationship with China where America is in a very strong, competitive position, but also where we have the ability to engage diplomatically with China in ways that help ensure the competition does not veer into conflict. That is not an easy feat. It is not a task that is ever complete. That is going to have to be an ongoing aspect of U.S.-China relations into the future.
But the hand that we were dealt was one thing; the hand that we are passing off when it comes to U.S.-China, I believe we have significantly enhanced America’s position.
MR. BREMMER: Look, I mean, I think it’s pretty clear. One, you’ve got general bipartisan agreement on what a U.S.-China relationship should look like, which is not true of a lot of areas of foreign policy. And two, the relationship has been stabilized, even potentially strengthened, without the Americans giving up any fundamental equities. So, I mean, those two things definitely help.
But I want to press a little bit on the tactical shift, because I accept that China still thinks long term, you know, the world is their oyster. But, I mean, clearly, the last year has gone a lot worse for them than they expected. Zero-COVID went a lot worse for them than they expected. We see from Chinese leadership now them talking about concerns, even on social instability and dissent, that this can’t be tolerated.
So it’s clearly getting up to the top leadership, and they’re saying, “What are you guys doing?” We see, like, all of these ministers of defense, minister of for- — other — U.S. ambassador, right, getting done up for corruption. So it’s not been the best few years. It’s been a rough ride for them.
And you have spent — I’m not sure if the audience here knows — but you have spent an extraordinary amount of personal time with Wang Yi over the months, right, since the APEC Summit.
Talk about, tactically, how you have perceived a shift in China’s negotiating stance, position; how engaging they’re willing to be; how, if at all, they’re seeing the United States right now.
And I’m specifically asking this as we all are thinking about 60 percent tariffs coming from Trump, thinking about a much more potentially assertive out-of-the-box position that China — that they’re going to be facing.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, you know, I think one feature of my conversations with Wang Yi — and we tend to get together every few months for two days, and have somewhere between 12 and 15 hours of conversation — but we don’t cover every issue under the sun in the U.S.-China relationship. We focus on a few key subjects.
And what makes that conversation different in 2024 than it was in 2022 is that it is much more about each of us kind of asking questions of the other — what our limits are, what our boundaries are, where are we taking things, what’s this all about. There’s a much more inquisitive dynamic to the dialogue than there used to be.
And I’ll give you an example. We’ve taken a series of measures to protect American advanced technology so that it can’t be used by the Chinese military to threaten us or our allies, including advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Obviously, the PRC did not like this.
MR. BREMMER: And we’ve done that with allies.
MR. SULLIVAN: And we’ve done it with key allies who —
MR. BREMMER: The Netherlands, Japan, South Korea.
MR. SULLIVAN: — are part of that semiconductor ecosystem so that, collectively, we can ensure that Western technology, built on an American backbone, doesn’t end up being used by the PRC.
MR. BREMMER: Which they really don’t like.
MR. SULLIVAN: They don’t like it.
So it used to be that it would just be what, in diplomatic terms, is called a demarche, but, you know, which in layman’s terms is just like basically a screed against, you know, “You have done these terrible, evil things. You are very bad.” And that would be the nature of the conversation.
Now the conversation is them asking us or us asking them, “What do you see as being the boundary between economics, on the one hand, and national security on the other? Define that for me. How do you think about it?”
And I’m not naïve enough to think that this is just some Socratic seminar. You know, they’ve got a purpose behind it. So do I. But it creates the opportunity to have a strategic conversation to try to clarify intentions, to try to look for opportunities where we can come to better understanding.
And frequently it’s going to lead, at the end, to deep disagreement. They strongly disagree with what we are doing, just as when we talk about the relationship between Russia and China, or their support for Russia’s defense industrial base in the war in Ukraine, I’m pushing them with a series of questions, and at the end, I’m not satisfied with all the answers, which is why we take certain actions that include PRC entities.
But that, to me, the aspect of the relationship that has evolved is the ability for the two of us to engage in a dialogue that is less about the exchange of demarches and more about trying to feel one another out what we’re up to and, you know, what the actual right and left limits are of the kinds of actions each of us are taking.
Then there’s one other aspect of the relationship that has evolved over time, which is: We had a big debate early on between us, which is, our view was: You can compete and you can also work together in areas of mutual interest. The PRC’s view was: If you are intent on competition, then why should we cooperate with you?
I think we have evolved that to a point where we both see managed competition as involving elements of relentless and intense competition, on the one hand, but also areas where we can, in fact, work together where our interests align and where, frankly, we have to work together.
Just one very simple example. For the first time in decades, President Biden and President Xi actually put out a statement about nuclear risk reduction. It was a very simple statement. It said that humans, not artificial intelligence, should be —
MR. BREMMER: Have a hand on the switch at all times.
MR. SULLIVAN: — what determines —
MR. BREMMER: Absolutely.
MR. SULLIVAN: — use of nuclear weapons.
MR. BREMMER: And that was just a few months ago.
MR. SULLIVAN: That should be apparent to everyone. That took months, maybe years, to negotiate.
But we are there. We are finally there. Even at the same time that they’re placing export controls on certain critical minerals, we’re updating our export controls on semiconductors.
All of this is happening at once because there is a recognition that managed competition requires being able to have some areas where we can work together and see if you can expand those areas, even as you’re competing vigorously in technology, in economics, in the military domain, and in others.
MR. BREMMER: Well, and part of that is just understanding and being able to articulate that the intention of U.S. strategy in the long term is not regime change in China. It’s a recognition that we’re going to be living together in some way.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, it’s interesting because there is a school of thought that is fairly prominent in Washington that says, in fact, the position that we, the Biden administration, have taken — which is we would like to put ourselves in the best possible position to compete effectively on behalf of ourselves and our allies, that we will take actions to do that, but we also are going to have to live alongside China as a major power — that that second part is wrong; that, in fact, we should be driving towards a defeat or capitulation.
And, you know, there was an op-ed written by Mike Gallagher, a person I respect enormously —
MR. BREMMER: Smart guy.
MR. SULLIVAN: — but disagree with him on this particular point —
MR. BREMMER: On that issue. Absolutely.
MR. SULLIVAN: — precisely making this argument.
So I do think there will be a debate in the years ahead in Washington between those who say we’re going to compete and we’re going to be clear-eyed and relentless in the competition, and those who say but that there’s got — there’s not an end state, it’s a steady state of competition, and those who say, “No, no, no, you’ve got to bring down the CCP.”
MR. BREMMER: But I want to be clear what I’m saying. I believe the reason that there has been movement between the U.S. and China in recognizing that we can do managed competition and also have cooperation is because the perspective of the United States government today is that the U.S. is not trying to ultimately engage in regime change in China. And if that were to change, I suspect the Chinese position on this would be quite different.
MR. SULLIVAN: Right. Action would cause reaction in a quite dramatic way, and I think you would have considerable destabilization.
MR. BREMMER: So I want to ask you an intellectually challenging question around this. Given that the Chinese are now willing to engage with you and vice versa, in not just demarches, what have you learned from China that you didn’t know before, a year ago?
MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, man. That’s a hard question. It’s like — it’s sort of like being asked what’s your biggest weakness. And you say, “I try too hard,” you know, kind of thing.
MR. BREMMER: Yeah, don’t do that, because — (laughter) —
MR. SULLIVAN: (Laughs.) What have I learned from China?
MR. BREMMER: That’s why I warned you it was going to be intellectually challenging. I wanted to give you a second, you know? Because (inaudible) live, so we can take out all of the hum and —
MR. SULLIVAN: I mean, at some level I’ve learned a lot — just, you are going to learn a lot talking to someone on issues of substance for 15 hours — about their perspective, their calculus, their logic, their strategy, and including kind of what they say and what’s behind what they say.
But in terms of, like, larger lessons, it’s a good question. I’d have to think about it, and I worry that any answer I give you today is just going to get me in trouble. (Laughter.) So, I’ll —
MR. BREMMER: Well, and you only got a few weeks to get in trouble. So from that perspective — (laughter) —
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, come back to me on January 21st. I’ll give you a full laydown.
MR. BREMMER: Well, I’ll ask you over dinner. It makes it easier.
So, okay. How about big picture, China and macro-geopolitics, which is — actually, another difficult question. I remember when the Secretary of State put out a recent piece in Foreign Affairs talking about kind of an axis of Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China. NATO Allies have also talked about that a fair bit. My perspective is three of those countries would be very happy with different government. Three of those countries, we don’t feel the need that we have to live side by side with them long term. One of them, we do, as we just discussed.
I’m wondering to what extent you believe that some of the areas that we can work with China, should work with China in the long term, have to do with stabilization of the global environment. I mean, they’re the largest creditor to the Global South. The United States is also really interested in the Global South not falling apart. Very different than Russia’s perspective with the former Wagner Group in the Sahel, for example, right?
At the end of the day, as you said, the Chinese aren’t doing very much in the Middle East, but in principle, the Chinese want stability in the Middle East, because they get a lot of energy from the Middle East; they want to invest in and through the Middle East.
Russia invading Ukraine was supposed to be over in a couple weeks, from China’s perspective. Now it’s screwed up their relations with the Europeans. That’s a problem for them.
So how much can, how much should the United States be trying to treat China as a country that should want to have a more stable environment geopolitically?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, what I say to my Chinese interlocutors is that part of their public messaging, and in their private messaging to us, is we don’t want a new Cold War and we don’t like what they call bloc confrontation. This is their asserted position.
And so, the point I make to them is: Putin does want a new Cold War, does want bloc confrontation, and North Korea is happy to go along with that, as to your point, probably as Iran. I think Iran has, you know, kind of got just a different agenda that’s more regionally focused, but nonetheless sort of along that line.
MR. BREMMER: They’re also in a lot more trouble.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah, exactly.
China has a choice to make. China has a choice to make. And it can either continue to tighten those links militarily, diplomatically, and otherwise, and end up in a circumstance where it is really part of an axis, or it could do what I think is much more natural from the point of view of China’s perspective, interest, and opportunity, which is to be a huge competitor to the United States; let’s make no bones about that. And we are going to compete vigorously for shaping the future. And I believe that if we fall well behind in that competition, it will be to our tremendous detriment.
But on climate, on macroeconomic stability, on questions related to ensuring that the risks associated with things like artificial intelligence do not spin out of control, even on issues like the Iranian nuclear program, we ought to be able to find a way where our interests and China’s interests sufficiently align, that having a constructive agenda to go alongside the intense competition serves the American people and serves the people of the world, for that matter.
But that comes — a lot of — you know, most of the time, people ask that series of questions from the point of view of, “What are you going to do, America, to help make that happen? How are you going to be nicer to China so that China, you know, is willing to do these things?”
And I think we’ve reached a point in this relationship where, really, actually, it’s China’s choice to make more than it is ours. They have to decide is Xi going to, you know — going to make the Xi-Putin kind of personal relationship the dominant issue, or is the PRC going to think of itself as a distinct kind of actor that is not part of this axis.
I personally don’t think they fully made that decision one way or the other.
MR. BREMMER: Which is a good reason to press them on it.
MR. SULLIVAN: Exactly. The risk is really there that they will go down a darker path. I think it’s our job to engage in statecraft and diplomacy, backed by the types of competitive actions we’ve taken and backed by strong allies who are all aligned around a common vision to try to get them to make the right choice that would serve our interests better for them to tack differently from the way these other countries are tacked.
MR. BREMMER: So is it fair to say that labeling them part of an axis with Russia, North Korea, and Iran is not necessarily the most helpful way to accomplish that?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, that’s an interesting question.
What I would say — I would just put it differently myself. I would say that there is greater alignment today, including China, among these countries, and we’re seeing it in ways that are quite worrying. But it is not preordained that China ends up foursquare in this axis. And we can do things to shape the environment, and China then has choices to make. And I think the world should put the onus on China to make the right choice.
MR. BREMMER: See, this is why he’s National Security Advisor. That was a tough question to answer, definitely.
Okay, so to pivot to Russia, but use the China thing — I wasn’t planning on pulling out a Trump tweet, but I’m going to for the hell of it, which is — you know, he came out the other day talking about Ukraine, and at the end threw in this “and China can help.” I was a little surprised by that. Were you a little surprised by that?
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. That stood out to me.
MR. BREMMER: Why?
MR. SULLIVAN: Because it’s something I’ve grappled with, actually, personally — is, you know, having had long conversations, not just with China but with Europeans and with the Ukrainians, about what kind of role could China play in all of this. And, you know, the Ukrainians have made no secret about the fact that they want to engage and talk to China about, you know, how we get, ultimately, to a just peace in Ukraine. And, you know, Ukraine has been concerned about some of the initiatives that China has put forward, but has wanted to really engage them. They have a relationship with Russia.
And so, you know, the idea that China could in some way be a part of the conversation about generating a just peace in Ukraine is not — that’s not a crazy idea. Now, on the other hand, you don’t want China dictating terms in Ukraine, and you don’t want them becoming the dominant broker in the European theater.
So it’s a question of figuring out what is the appropriate way for them to be engaged as a permanent member of the Security Council, as a significant player on the world stage, and as one of the few countries that Russia would have to listen to if China really spoke up.
I think that President Trump putting that on the table is logical, because I’ve kind of worked through the same thought in my own head.
MR. BREMMER: Yeah, and because, look, we hadn’t been in a position where we were talking about imminent negotiations; we now appear to be moving in that direction.
If you were national security advisor in that environment, and talking to Wang Yi, my expectation is that would end up being one of the major topics that you would discuss.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, it would be to say, you know, what is the shape of the table going to be, who’s going to be at it. Obviously, Ukraine and Russia have to be there, but who else. And what could China bring to that in the way we ask that question about what China has brought to the P5+1 negotiations on Iran —
MR. BREMMER: With the JCPOA —
MR. SULLIVAN: — or anything else. Yeah, that would be a question.
Now, I don’t know exactly what the answer would be. I see pitfalls in all of that, but I think it’s an interesting thing that needs to be explored as we go forward.
MR. BREMMER: So let’s move to Russia before I take a couple questions from the audience, and maybe a little technology, because we haven’t discussed that really.
On the Russia front: Clearly, I mean, we’ve had three years where the Ukrainians weren’t much interested in talking about negotiations; now they appear to be much more. Some of that is Trump. Some of that is the situation on the ground becoming more challenging for them. Where do you think an eventual — what does the shape of a settlement look like, in your view?
MR. SULLIVAN: I’m going to disappoint you with my answer to this, because I’ve given the same answer for three years, which is, at the end of the day —
MR. BREMMER: It’s up to the Ukrainians.
MR. SULLIVAN: It’s up to the Ukrainians.
MR. BREMMER: I knew you were going to say that. Yeah, I know. But the Ukrainian position is changing, right? By definition. I mean, they’re now saying maybe they need to give up land. They didn’t say that before. I mean, NATO looks like it’s getting kicked down the road more and more. Trump probably wouldn’t accept it.
I mean, if you’re Trump, is it useful for you to be leaning into Ukraine just to get more space to say that we can get a negotiation? Is that a good way to start it?
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I think one of the most critical things that the United States — the current administration, the next administration — need to show is a willingness to stand behind Ukraine and ensure that they have what they need to defend themselves, because that is going to be the leverage necessary to get a good outcome at the table.
So I would like to see a continuation of the basic proposition that the United States will continue to provide Ukraine with the defensive capacity, the military capacity necessary to withstand the Russian onslaught, to pressure Russia militarily as we pressure them economically so that Ukraine is in the best possible position on the battlefield, which will put them in a better position at the negotiating table.
I think just coming out and saying we’re going to do a deal, without that extra piece, is not going to put Ukraine in the best position at the negotiating table.
MR. BREMMER: Is it fair to say that the United States was counting more on economic sanctions early on than they should have, and less on military support for Ukraine than they should have? And those positions have balanced out?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think it is fair to say that the predictions about the impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy have not borne out, certainly not on the timeline that was anticipated back in 2022.
I think it’s equally fair to say that Russia’s economy is in real trouble right now, and that trouble is going to mount in 2025.
MR. BREMMER: How will it manifest?
MR. SULLIVAN: So, first, you have significant and growing inflation. You have interest rates above 20 percent, which is putting a huge dent in the ability to invest. You have Russia having to stretch further and further to recruit soldiers, paying more and more to do so, expending more and more of its budget, spending down its sovereign wealth fund so that it’s depleting its cash reserves.
And all of that has a compounding effect over time. And when you add that to the fact that the casualty rates among Russians are just eye popping, and even more so in the last couple of months, I believe that these costs over time are going to grow.
Now, could I pick a month where they all come together to put real pressure on the Russians to come to the table? I couldn’t. But I think the conventional wisdom from a few months ago, which is Russia has got it made in the shade economically, they’re going to be okay, they can do this indefinitely — I don’t think the economic signals we’re seeing right now bear that out.
And I would make one more point that I think is really important for people to take into account. We tend, I think, as democracies, to think, “Oh, we’re not doing so great, and those dictators are so strategic and they’re doing so well.” If I had told you three years ago that Joe Biden was going to announce a special military operation to take Ottawa in a week, and three years later, he was in the wheat fields of Manitoba losing thousands of soldiers a month, with inflation over 10 percent and interest rates in America over 20 percent, 600,000 Americans either dead or wounded, and we’re inching out little Canadian town by little Canadian town —
MR. BREMMER: Because this is the Trump plan, by the way. I don’t know if you know this. (Laughter.)
MR. SULLIVAN: (Laughs.) Yeah.
I mean, you would have said — you wouldn’t sit here saying, “Wow, America is really winning that war in a big way. That’s great for America.” You would never say that. But somehow we’re saying, “Oh, the Russians, they’re doing great.” They are not doing great. They set out on a strategic objective of taking the capital Kyiv; wiping Ukraine, as we know it, off the map — maybe not literally wiping the country off the map but —
MR. BREMMER: The regime.
MR. SULLIVAN: — (inaudible) democratic, independent —
MR. BREMMER: Taking the regime out.
MR. SULLIVAN: — Western-oriented Ukraine, gone. It would be a vassal state to Russia. And they have failed in that, and they will fail in that.
They are now fighting and imposing huge costs, and I don’t want to discount those costs. But let’s not forget that Kyiv stands, Ukraine stands. Ukraine will stand at the end of this. And the thing we can most do is create circumstances for a negotiation where they have some strength and capacity behind them and it is not imposed upon them. And that’s what I would like to see in the months ahead.
And, frankly, I believe that whether it was President Trump, which it will be, or it were President Harris, had she won, this turn to negotiations is something that Zelenskyy was looking to do.
MR. BREMMER: It was necessary. Yeah.
MR. SULLIVAN: Now we have an opportunity, but that opportunity should rest on the proposition that Ukraine is in the driver’s seat and is not going to have an outcome imposed
upon them.
MR. BREMMER: And NATO is stronger, and people are spending more money and more committed to it, and there are two additional members. And, I mean, you know, Assad just fell.
I mean, there are a lot of ways that any one objective can say the Russians are not winning. I think there are lots of ways objectively to say the Ukrainians are not winning too, to be fair.
MR. SULLIVAN: That is fair, and it’s important actually to pause on that point for a moment, because my account really kind of only speaks to one side of it.
I mean, what has been visited upon the Ukrainians, on the brave soldiers on the front lines, on people — innocent people in towns and cities having missiles and bombs rained down on them; on Putin attempting to plunge the country into cold and darkness in the heart of winter and so much else — I mean, I’m not trying to be cavalier about any of that. That is real.
Now, at the same time that that is happening, the Ukrainian people want to make sure that they are not just stopping the war for the sake of it. They want a just peace, and we should support them in wanting a just peace.
MR. BREMMER: I’m glad you said that. Not that I’m surprised by it, but it’s useful to mention.
Okay, we’ve got questions here, and fortunately, there are also a couple aligned with technology. And you and I talk about technology a lot. The technology space is moving a lot faster than the national security government space. AI is an area that previous administrations haven’t had to deal with. You have.
Tell me — on the one hand, the United States has a strong geopolitical position with so many of the world-changing companies based in the U.S. On the other, increasingly, this is a group of people, a group of companies that aren’t necessarily fully aligned with U.S. national security interests. Tell me where you see those tensions and what you’re most concerned about for the next couple of years.
MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first, I think the big American technology companies have done a quite remarkable job in driving innovation forward in artificial intelligence. You see it with Google, you see it with Microsoft, you see it with Meta. Like, having major American technology companies with capital to deploy and ambition to deploy has pushed the edge of artificial intelligence in ways that have given the United States a competitive edge and a real lead. That is a national asset. It is.
Now, on the other hand, America’s technological edge has always rested on not just having big tech companies, on having startups and a very competitive, very mixed ecosystem. And so, one of the risk factors I see is making sure that we are continuing to nurture and ensure that these companies can come forward, the little guys, to produce new innovations and new technological solutions. So, that’s one issue.
Second issue is that we need to, on the one hand, balance between ensuring that the most advanced AI at the frontier continues to be generated, produced, so to speak, in the United States so that we’re not outsourcing it to other countries and we’re not trading one form of dependence for another, but on the other hand, we’re allowing this technology to be diffused globally so that America maintains its technological leadership elsewhere. How you strike that balance, I think, is extremely challenging. It’s something we’re focused on right now and the next administration is going to have to focus on as well.
MR. BREMMER: I got a question on TikTok as a risk. Do you think that it is a security risk to the United States?
MR. SULLIVAN: Our intelligence professionals, our national security professionals — not the politicians, the professionals — have looked at this and have seen the national security risks. That’s why you have this legislation from the Congress for divestment.
And I will be — not say much more than that, because there’s a whole legal process associated with it that I shouldn’t speak to, but there are both data risks and algorithm risks associated with TikTok under current ownership, and that has been laid out not by me, sitting here, but by the intelligence community and those who sit and kind of look at and try to size up these risks. And it has led to a circumstance in which we have this impending deadline.
MR. BREMMER: When you look at the principal actors in artificial intelligence in the United States, how much do you think of them as geopolitical actors that have degrees of real independence from what the U.S. government might or might not want?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think of them as geopolitical actors in that they have a big impact on geopolitics. I’m less convinced that the leadership of these companies sit around and think, “I’m going to shape the world with my image, or I want to play as a geopolitical actor alongside a nation-state.”
So I think of it more as the result of their existence than as the object of their existence. But we have to take that — seriously, that is part of the firmament in geopolitics now. And we have to consider the fact that, yes, as you said, these are American companies, but they’re not like Chinese state-owned enterprises. They have their own incentives. They have their own strategies and objectives. And much of that is very much aligned with the values and the direction that the United States wants to go. But they are independent actors, and we have to take that into account.
MR. BREMMER: I remember talking a couple of years ago with you about the fact that you said, like, one of the biggest frustrations is it’s hard to have a trade policy. And there are a lot of political constraints around that.
It’s easier to have an industrial policy. Do you think that the industrial policy the U.S. government has right now in the tech space is adequate, is up to speed for what it needs to be geopolitically? And if it isn’t, what else needs to happen?
MR. SULLIVAN: I think that we’ve taken great strides forward with respect to investment in the basic research and the innovation base of the United States, with respect to semiconductor manufacturing, clean energy manufacturing; the infrastructure that will get built out that can help propel economic and technological growth in all dimensions; steps we’ve taken on biotechnology and biomanufacturing.
I’m extremely proud of the legacy we leave over the last four years. And that’s not just a domestic economic story; that is a national security story. It’s something that I personally have cared passionately about as National Security Advisor.
If I had to pick one thing that makes me nervous, it is the need for us to deploy clean energy really rapidly, to have sufficient clean energy to power the compute necessary to continue to stay at the cutting edge of artificial intelligence. And that is going to require us to take steps to break down barriers, remove obstacles. And we’re trying to figure out if there’s anything we can do just in our remaining time to be able to make that happen. But it is also something that we will be communicating very vigorously to the next administration too.
We have got to be able to increase overall clean energy output so that we are increasing our overall capacity at a basic level of compute so that we maintain the lead in AI and in other technological areas.
MR. BREMMER: Closer relationship with Canada, if and when they have a government, might be part of that.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. Not invading them, I guess, would probably help.
MR. BREMMER: Yeah, yeah. That’s probably right. Well, if he’s already the 51st governor, you know, for now, it’s already taken care of.
So here’s an interesting question that I bet a lot of people are thinking about: Why did President Biden’s foreign policy for the middle class never gain traction with the broad American public?
MR. SULLIVAN: It’s a good question. I mean, first of all, I think that foreign policy in general tends to be more difficult to penetrate, unless it’s at a quite elemental level — the United States is directly at war, or you have a dramatic event like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
I think the way that I would answer that question is to say I think the tagline never penetrated, but I would posit to you that, over time, if many of the things that he did — the technology protections, the industrial policy, the supply chain diversification and resilience, the friend-shoring and building out of allied ecosystems — these are things that don’t happen in a year or two years; they happen over a decade or a generation.
And I would posit that we have now planted the seeds that will be harvested in the future in ways where people say, “I like that. That is working for me.” I feel like we have an industrial and innovation base here that can generate good jobs and economic growth. I feel like we’ve got supply chains that are not going to get cracked because of a pandemic or because of China. I feel like our technology is not being used against us in ways I don’t like.
These are all things that I regard as part of foreign policy for the middle class, that if you’re sitting in 2023, 2024 in the U.S., you’re at the very early stage of that. But we carry that forward over a generation, and I think you can build a new consensus around that. People would say that is the kind of approach that I would like to see, not just as a matter of domestic policy, but as a matter of international economic policy.
And frankly, one group of people who looked at what we have done in this regard and said “Hey, we should be doing that too” are all of our allies. The Japanese the Koreans, the Europeans have all said, “We’ve got to do that.” Draghi just put out a big report, basically describing —
MR. BREMMER: Competitiveness report.
MR. SULLIVAN: — this sort of theory.
MR. BREMMER: Absolutely.
MR. SULLIVAN: So —
MR. BREMMER: It’s great in theory. Yeah.
MR. SULLIVAN: I think it will take longer for that to fully penetrate, but I think — I have conviction that if we stick with it as a country, I believe it will penetrate.
MR. BREMMER: Interestingly, I mean, not only do allies recognize that this is a strategy they need to do more of, but, I mean, I would argue that this is an area of foreign policy that the Biden administration, the incoming Trump administration actually do have a lot of overlap on. This is a place that I wouldn’t expect to see a great deal of difference.
MR. SULLIVAN: I think that’s right. I mean, it’s hard to know exactly, because there are a lot of different voices, and it’s possible to take the basic core of this strategy in an extremely aggressive direction, like the 60 percent tariffs you were talking about earlier.
MR. BREMMER: Or 25 on Mexico. Yeah, sure.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, for me, that the essential insights I think are fairly common. The manifestation or the implementation of those insights could look radically different and we’ll have to wait and see what actually happens.
MR. BREMMER: Okay, before we close then, let me give you a completely random one.
South Korea. What the hell, Jake? (Laughter.) I mean, you know, good ally, solid ally. We got the Japan-South Korea relationship stable and everything. And then he just kind of completely lost the plot, in very short order. Did you see that coming?
MR. SULLIVAN: I cannot say that I saw the declaration of martial law, you know, on a night come and then have it reversed 24 hours later and everything. No.
MR. BREMMER: It was like six hours.
MR. SULLIVAN: Did not see that coming.
But we had January 6th.
MR. BREMMER: Yeah.
MR. SULLIVAN: So, I think it’s important for us to recognize that dramatic events happen even in highly advanced, consolidated democracies. And the real test is, can the democratic institutions hold at the end of the day, even if they bend.
And if you look at those dramatic moments in South Korea, with protesters pushing aside the guns of the troops that were deployed to block the National Assembly so that the assembly couldn’t go in to repudiate the declaration of martial law; if you look at the fact that, actually, now the processes are working, they’re going through their paces — it was quite a moment and something that I think we’re not entirely out of the woods on because there’s still more, you know, chapters in this play until everything has worked through the courts and so forth. But the institutions in South Korea are holding.
It’s a good reminder, though, that surprising things happen. You know, if you had asked a lot of people around the world was January 6th going to happen, they would have said, “No, I was very surprised by that.” We’re going to have more of these surprises in the future.
I mean, one thing that we have to keep in mind is we are in a new era. It is — the post-Cold War era is over. There’s a competition underway for what comes next. It is challenging. It is at times turbulent. And from my perspective, what the United States has to do is try to strengthen its fundamental hand so it can deal with whatever comes next, and there will be surprises.
So as National Security Advisor, what I ask myself is: Are our alliances stronger than when we found them? And I think the answer is yes. Are our adversaries and competitors weaker than when we found them? And I would say yes. Have we kept the country out of war? Have we kept the homeland safe? Have we protected our technology for being used against us? And do we have the instruments of American power — our economy, our technological engine, our infrastructure, our defense industrial base — in a better position? Yes.
So we should have confidence that we can deal with this challenging and turbulent world. But it’s tough. It is tough out there. And it’s not just in places like the Middle East. It can happen in the ROK. It can happen in the United States of America.
The real key is do you have the basic elements of American power and capacity in a place where we can deal with our geopolitical competitors and also deal with the great trends of our time — the clean energy transition, AI, and so forth — and can you pass off a better hand than the hand that you were dealt despite all of the things happening in the world.
That’s how we have to keep our eye on the prize. And I think the United States should look at what we’ve got going for us and say, “Man, you know, it’s challenging out there, but yes, we are in a position to do very well for ourselves, for our friends, for our people, if we keep our wits about us.”
And that’s what I would like, at the end of the day, the conclusion of my time in this seat — I guess, literally this seat, but also the National Security Advisor seat — that’s really what I walk away from.
And then, coming back to your question about China, maybe that’s part of an answer. I think this is how they —
MR. BREMMER: I knew you were going to get their eventually.
MR. SULLIVAN: You know? But honestly, as part of listening to Wang Yi, they tend to look at success, so to speak, in geopolitics and foreign policy as not about doctrine or about, sort of, a narrative. They look at it on the basis of assets and liabilities: You know, do we have strong friends and less strong enemies? Are we entangled in war? Is our homeland under attack from terrorists or others? You know, where do we stand on technology, on the economy, on supply chains, and so forth?
That is something I think that the PRC, over 30 years, what helped them move so rapidly is they had that kind of mindset. I think in a challenging and turbulent world, the United States needs to be thinking about that as well, not just in the chess board of geopolitics, but in terms of us being up for the big challenges of the moment.
MR. BREMMER: And in the strategic ledger.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
MR. BREMMER: Long term, who are the people that the Americans feel like we can count on around the world. And there, the Chinese, if they took an honest-to-God strategic look, shouldn’t be thinking the United States is in decline.
MR. SULLIVAN: Exactly. And also should be saying, “Wow, I’d much rather have what the U.S. has, these powerful, capable democracies, even if they have weird moments like the martial law declaration, as opposed to when China looks around at who its really core group of friends are or could be.
So, yeah, we got — we have a lot going for us, without for a moment trying to whistle past huge — a huge plastic moment of turbulence and transition that’s going to be with us for quite some time. We’ve just got to be prepared to say we have what it takes, alongside our friends, to navigate this moment in a way that will serve our people well.
MR. BREMMER: Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in thanking National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. (Applause.)
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